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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Dr. John Handron, a psychologist, appeals from the 
denial of his request for counsel fees following his challenge 
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to the government’s claim that he had overbilled Medicare 
and owed the government more than $600,000 in 
overpayments.  At an ALJ hearing to contest the 
government’s claim, Dr. Handron presented extensive 
evidence, but the government neither appeared nor presented 
argument or advocacy, either written or in person.  The ALJ 
concluded that the overpayment was actually $5,434.48.  Dr. 
Handron then moved, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice 
Act (“EAJA”), 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), to recoup the tens of 
thousands of dollars in attorneys’ fees and expenses he 
incurred in fighting the overpayment demand.  His request for 
fees was denied by an administrative appeals council and the 
District Court based on their conclusion that the hearing 
before the ALJ was not an “adversary adjudication,” as is 
required for an award of fees under the EAJA.   
While we sympathize with Dr. Handron’s plight, we 
are constrained to agree with the determination that, given the 
statutory definition of an “adversary adjudication,” his 
request was properly denied.  At the same time, we disagree 
with the District Court’s ruling that the mere fact that the 
government did not appear in person at the hearing was a 
sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the adjudication 
was not adversary in nature.      
 
I. 
 
a.  The EAJA 
 
The EAJA was passed, in large part, to allow 
individuals and small businesses to fight back against 
unjustified government action, without fear that the high cost 
of doing so would make victory ultimately more expensive 
than acquiescence.  H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 5-6 (1980), 
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reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984; John J. Sullivan, Note, 
The Equal Access to Justice Act in the Federal Courts, 84 
Colum. L. Rev. 1089, 1092-93 (1984).  It empowers parties 
who prevail against the government, either in an 
administrative proceeding or in a civil action, to collect their 
fees and other expenses from the government.  5 U.S.C. § 
504(a)(1)
1
; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)
2
.  However, Congress 
                                              
1
 That sub-section reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
An agency that conducts an adversary 
adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party 
other than the United States, fees and other 
expenses incurred by that party in connection 
with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative 
officer of the agency finds that the position of 
the agency was substantially justified or that 
special circumstances make an award unjust. 
5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). 
2
 That sub-section provides:  
[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other 
than the United States fees and other expenses . 
. . incurred by that party in any civil action 
(other than cases sounding in tort) . . . brought 
by or against the United States in any court 
having jurisdiction of that action, unless the 
court finds that the position of the United States 
was substantially justified or that special 
circumstances make an award unjust. 
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).  
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placed several limitations on a party’s ability to recover fees 
under the EAJA.  Relevant here, parties who prevail against 
the government in an agency proceeding can only collect their 
fees under the EAJA if the proceeding was an “adversary 
adjudication.”  5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1).  An “adversary 
adjudication” is defined, in relevant part, as “an adjudication 
under section 554 of [Title 5, United States Code] in which 
the position of the United States is represented by counsel or 
otherwise, but excludes an adjudication for the purpose of 
establishing or fixing a rate or for the purpose of granting or 
renewing a license.”  5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C).   
The House Report for the bill makes clear that the 
adversary adjudication requirement was designed, in part, to 
“narrow the scope of the bill in order to make its costs 
acceptable.”  H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 14, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4993; see also id. at 20, reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4999 (“[T]he Committee has 
eliminated non-adversary adjudications (including 
administrative proceedings under the Social Security Act) 
from the coverage of the principal part of this bill, and 
believes that is a significant factor in reducing the cost.”).  
That report also commented that “[i]t is basic fairness that the 
United States not be liable in an administrative proceeding in 
which its interests are not represented.”  Id. at 12, reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4991.   The Conference Report for 
the bill stated that the definition of “adversary adjudication” 
was intended to “preclude[] an award in a situation where an 
agency, e.g., the Social Security Administration, does not take 
a position in the adjudication.”  H.R. Conf. Rep. 96-1434, at 
23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5012. 
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In 1985, when Congress reauthorized
3
 and amended 
the EAJA, it reaffirmed the adversary adjudication 
requirement.  The House report noted the following: 
One issue which needs clarification is what 
coverage, if any, is allowed under the Equal 
Access to Justice Act for Social Security 
Administration hearings at the administrative 
level.  As enacted in 1980, the Act covers 
“adversary adjudications”—i.e., an adjudication 
under Section 554 of Title 5, United States 
Code “in which the position of the United 
States is represented by counsel or otherwise.” 
While this language generally excludes Social 
Security Administrative hearings from the Act, 
Congress made clear in 1980 that “If  * * * the 
agency does take a position at some point in the 
adjudication, the adjudication would then 
become adversarial,” and thus be subject to the 
Act.  It is the committee’s understanding that 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services has 
implemented an experiment in five locations in 
which the Secretary is represented at the 
hearing before the administrative law judge.  
This is precisely the type of situation covered 
by section 504(b)(1)(C).  While, generally, 
Social Security administrative hearings remain 
outside the scope of this statute, those in which 
                                              
3
 The EAJA as originally passed included a sunset provision.  
In 1985, Congress repealed the sunset provision and made the 
EAJA permanent.  See H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 20-21, 29 
(1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 149. 
7 
 
the Secretary is represented are covered by the 
Act. 
H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 10 (1985), reprinted in 1985 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 138-39 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. 96-1434, 
at 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5012) (emphasis 
and ellipsis in original).  
The EAJA also tasked the Administrative Conference 
of the United States with interpreting the statute and 
developing model rules.  See Scafar Contracting, Inc. v. Sec’y 
of Labor, 325 F.3d 422, 428 n.4 (3d Cir. 2003); 5 U.S.C. § 
504(c)(1) (“After consultation with the Chairman of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, each agency 
shall by rule establish uniform procedures for the submission 
and consideration of applications for an award of fees and 
other expenses.”).  The Administrative Conference’s model 
rule implementing 5 U.S.C. § 504 states that an agency 
proceeding is an “adversary adjudication” under the EAJA if 
“the position of this or any other agency of the United States, 
or any component of any agency, is presented by an attorney 
or other representative who enters an appearance and 
participates in the proceeding.”  46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,912 
(June 25, 1981).  The Department of Health and Human 
Services (“HHS”) adopted that model rule in substantially 
similar form when it promulgated regulations.  45 C.F.R. § 
13.3(a).
4
 
                                              
4
 That provision reads as follows: 
 
These rules apply only to adversary 
adjudications. For the purpose of these rules, 
only an adjudication required to be under 5 
U.S.C. 554, in which the position of the 
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HHS has also adopted regulations defining when the 
government—through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”) or one of its contractors—may participate 
in an ALJ hearing.  Participation is specifically defined and 
“may include filing position papers or providing testimony to 
clarify factual or policy issues in a case.”  42 C.F.R. § 
405.1010(c).  The regulations permit the ALJ to “request” 
such participation, but the ALJ “may not require” it.  Id. § 
405.1010(a).  Even if CMS or its contractors do participate, 
they may not be called as witnesses during the hearing.  Id. § 
405.1010(d). 
b.  Dr. Handron’s case 
Dr. Handron participated in the Medicare Part B 
program, treating nursing home patients and receiving 
reimbursement payments from Medicare.  In August 2003, he 
received a letter from Empire Medicare Services, on CMS 
letterhead, informing him that he had been overpaid from the 
Medicare program in the amount of $604,038.  The letter 
                                                                                                     
Department or one of its components is 
represented by an attorney or other 
representative (“the agency’s litigating party”) 
who enters an appearance and participates in the 
proceeding, constitutes an adversary 
adjudication. These rules do not apply to 
proceedings for the purpose of establishing or 
fixing a rate or for the purpose of granting, 
denying, or renewing a license. 
 
45 C.F.R. § 13.3(a). 
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stated that the “overpayment occurred because documentation 
did not support the services billed.”  (A100.)   
The letter was sent after an extensive review of Dr. 
Handron’s requests for reimbursement from Medicare.  Jana 
Clark, a nurse working for Eastern Benefits Integrity Center 
(“EA-BISC”), a government contractor, reviewed a sample of 
Dr. Handron’s Medicare claims from November 1994 to 
January 2001 to determine whether payments made to him 
were appropriate given the documents supporting his bills.  
Clark prepared a 64-page spreadsheet listing the more than 
2,500 claims she reviewed.  She assigned each claim one or 
more of fourteen codes, each of which represented a decision 
either to allow or deny a claim, along with a brief explanation 
of the reason for denial.  Clark explained the codes’ meaning 
in a two-page printed legend.  EA-BISC determined from this 
audit that Medicare overpaid Dr. Handron by $125,696.71 for 
the claims Clark reviewed.  It was extrapolated from that 
sample that Medicare had overpaid Dr. Handron by a total of 
$604,038 over his entire claims history. 
Dr. Handron hired a lawyer and challenged the 
government’s accusation.  He first filed an administrative 
appeal, and a Fair Hearing Officer largely upheld the 
government’s overpayment determination.  He then requested 
a hearing before an ALJ pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 405.1002(a), 
which took place on June 21-22 and July 24, 2007.  Dr. 
Handron appeared at this hearing along with his attorney, and 
he testified on his own behalf.  Dr. Handron also presented 
expert testimony from Christopher Barbrack, a psychologist, 
concerning the provision and documentation of psychological 
services.  The ALJ requested that CMS or one of its 
contractors appear as a non-party participant in the hearing, 
but no one filed a brief or sent a representative to the hearing 
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on behalf of the government.  CMS did, however, provide the 
ALJ with documents he requested to explain the procedure its 
consultants used to sample Dr. Handron’s claims and 
extrapolate findings therefrom.   
The ALJ reviewed Clark’s spreadsheet and legend, 
which detailed the claims that EA-BISC reviewed and 
explained the reasons EA-BISC felt the claims should be 
disallowed.  Also before the ALJ were twenty-five boxes of 
medical records from Dr. Handron’s treatment of Medicare 
patients.   
The ALJ slashed the government’s overpayment 
request, determining that the overpayment to Dr. Handron 
was actually only $5,434.48.  He found that EA-BISC failed 
to meet its burden of establishing an overpayment as to some 
of the claims and that some of the claims were outside of the 
limitations period for an overpayment action.  He then 
examined each of Clark’s fourteen codes and analyzed 
whether EA-BISC had met its burden of showing that each 
claim in its sample should be disallowed.  Of the $125,696.71 
of supposed overpayments that EA-BISC found in the sample 
claims, the ALJ found that only $5,434.48 was properly 
deemed overpayment.  As to EA-BISC’s “extrapolation” 
from the claims sample it reviewed, the ALJ sought input 
from an expert statistician, who concluded that the sampling 
was skewed against Dr. Handron in a way that exaggerated 
the extent of any overpayment indicated by the sample.  
Accordingly, the ALJ held that “the sampling procedures 
followed by EA-BISC in this case were unreliable and that 
the resultant extrapolation is invalid.”  (A80.)  Therefore, the 
ALJ held that only the $5,434.48 of overpayment he found 
warranted in EA-BISC’s sample of claims could be charged 
to Dr. Handron. 
11 
 
Dr. Handron thereafter filed an application pursuant to 
the EAJA, 5 U.S.C. § 504, to collect from HHS the attorneys’ 
fees and expenses he incurred in presenting his case against 
the overcharge claim.  The ALJ denied this application, 
holding that the position of the government was not 
represented at the hearing and that, therefore, Dr. Handron 
did not qualify for fee reimbursement under the EAJA.  Dr. 
Handron appealed the ALJ’s decision regarding fees to 
HHS’s Medicare Appeal Council (“MAC”), which adopted 
the ALJ’s decision denying an EAJA fee award.   
In June 2008, Dr. Handron filed a complaint in the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey appealing 
MAC’s decision disallowing EAJA fees.  He moved for 
summary judgment in March 2009.  The District Court denied 
Dr. Handron’s motion and affirmed MAC’s denial of EAJA 
fees.  Handron v. Sebelius, 669 F. Supp. 2d 490, 501 (D.N.J. 
2009).   
Recognizing that the government’s position was not 
represented at the ALJ hearing “by counsel,” the District 
Court examined the meaning of the words “or otherwise” in 
the EAJA’s definition of an adversary adjudication, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 504(b)(1)(C), and found the statutory language ambiguous.  
669 F. Supp. 2d at 495.  The District Court then looked to the 
statute’s legislative history and concluded that “Congress did 
not intend that the EAJA would apply simply because a 
person was fighting adverse government action[;] rather[,] 
Congress only intended that the EAJA would apply when the 
government participated in the proceeding.”  Id. at 496.  The 
District Court examined out-of-circuit case law and found 
that it supported the position that a person representing the 
government must physically appear at the hearing for it to 
constitute an adversary adjudication under the EAJA.  Id. at 
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497-99.  The District Court found further support for its 
conclusion in the Administrative Conference’s model rules, 
which state that a proceeding is adversarial if a government 
representative enters an appearance and participates in the 
proceeding.  Id. at 499-500 (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 
32,912).  Finally, the District Court reviewed the statute and 
concluded that “[t]he word ‘represented’ in [the] context of 
being coupled with ‘by counsel’ suggests that the statute 
requires some level of advocacy.”  Id. at 500.  The District 
Court then stated that “[a]dvocacy, in turn, in the context of a 
live adjudication seems to impart some modicum of real-time 
interplay with the fact-finder.”  Id.  Since the government did 
not send someone to physically represent it at Dr. Handron’s 
ALJ hearing, the District Court concluded that the EAJA did 
not apply to his case.  It therefore denied Dr. Handron’s 
motion for summary judgment and dismissed his case.   
Dr. Handron appealed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s 
interpretation of the EAJA is plenary.  Kadelski v. Sullivan, 
30 F.3d 399, 400 (3d Cir. 1994).   
II. 
a. 
 We begin by asking whether the District Court was 
correct in concluding that an agency hearing is not an 
“adversary adjudication” under the EAJA unless an individual 
representing the government appears at the proceeding in 
person.  We believe this is a misreading of the statute. 
 Nothing in the plain text of the statute supports the 
specific meaning that the District Court and the government 
attribute to the words “represented by counsel or otherwise” 
in 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(C).  To “represent” means to “stand[] 
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for or act[] on behalf of another, esp. by a lawyer on behalf of 
a client.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1416 (9th ed. 2009).  And 
“otherwise” is an open-ended term, meaning “in a different 
way or manner.”  Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144 
(2008) (citing Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
1598 (1961)); id. at 151 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 
Webster’s New International Dictionary 1729 (2d ed. 1957)).  
Congress did not specify in what way or manner the position 
of the United States could be represented, other than by 
counsel, and still implicate the EAJA.   
If Congress wanted to limit the EAJA’s applicability to 
cases in which an individual representing the government 
physically appeared at an agency proceeding, it could have so 
stated.  The statute does not say that the government’s 
position must be represented “by counsel or other individual 
appearing on its behalf.”  Such language would indicate the 
necessity of the actual presence at the hearing of someone 
representing the government, but that was not the language 
Congress chose.   
Instead, Congress chose language that left open the 
possibility that the government’s position could be 
represented in some other manner and by someone other than 
a lawyer.  This indicates Congress’s recognition that the 
position of the United States can be represented in many ways 
and its desire to grant judges some discretion in determining 
whether particular action “represents” the government’s 
position.  It does not suggest that the government’s position 
can only be represented at a hearing if a government 
representative physically stands before the decision-maker.  
Moreover, the fact that the statute speaks of the government’s 
position being represented, rather than the government itself, 
further suggests that a physical appearance at an agency 
14 
 
hearing is not necessary to implicate the EAJA.  While we 
speak of people being represented as meaning that they have 
advocates acting on their behalf, “[t]o represent a thing is to 
produce it publicly.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1301 (6th ed. 
1990).  That production can be as part of a public record, and 
need not be in person. 
Accordingly, we have little doubt that some forms of 
written advocacy submitted to an ALJ can constitute a 
representation of the government’s position, so as to make an 
agency proceeding an “adversary adjudication” for purposes 
of the EAJA.  A written statement is often an effective way to 
advocate one’s position.  We frequently decide cases in which 
the parties’ respective positions are represented solely by 
written submissions.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 34.1(a) (2011).  
While the appearance of an individual at a hearing will raise 
the level of advocacy for a given position, this does not mean 
that a position cannot be represented at a proceeding unless 
an individual is there to espouse the position. 
The government argues that the out-of-circuit case law 
on which the District Court relied refutes the argument that 
the position of the government can be represented by a 
writing.  We disagree.  The government cites to Willis v. 
Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1991) and Rowell v. Sullivan, 
813 F. Supp. 78 (D.D.C. 1993).  Neither case stands for the 
broad proposition the government claims. 
In Willis, a plaintiff argued that her disability 
proceedings were adversarial because the HHS Secretary’s 
counsel “responded by letter denying her request for answers 
to interrogatories and motions to produce” such that “the 
Secretary, in essence, was represented by counsel during the 
administrative proceedings on her disability claim.”  931 F.2d 
at 400.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that 
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argument, saying that the government’s letter refusing to give 
substantive responses to the plaintiff’s discovery requests 
“[did] not amount to the Secretary taking a position 
represented by counsel during the administrative phase of 
Willis’ disability claim.”  Id.  This was not a rejection of the 
principle that a writing could serve to represent the 
government’s position.  Rather, it was a straightforward 
recognition that a written refusal to respond substantively to 
discovery requests is not a representation of the government’s 
position in the underlying matter sufficient to invoke the 
EAJA. 
Similarly, Rowell does not support the government’s 
sweeping position that the position of the United States can 
never be represented by a writing.  In that case, an ALJ, 
Rowell, was under investigation by an HHS panel for 
potential bias.  813 F. Supp. at 79.  Rowell wrote to the panel 
that was investigating him and requested that sanctions be 
levied against certain attorneys—a matter distinct from the 
panel’s investigation.  Id. at 81.  An HHS attorney replied in 
writing to Rowell’s request.  Id.  Rowell later pointed to this 
letter as an indication that the panel proceeding was an 
adversary adjudication and that he was entitled to attorneys’ 
fees under the EAJA.  Id.  The district court rejected this 
argument, saying that the HHS attorneys’ letter simply 
informed Rowell that the agency would not initiate the 
ancillary sanction proceedings Rowell requested, and that this 
did not constitute representation of the agency’s position in 
the panel investigation of Rowell’s alleged bias.  Id.  This was 
not a sweeping proclamation that a writing can never 
represent the government’s position, but, rather, was another 
example in which a writing was not sufficient to constitute a 
representation of the government’s position. 
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 The government urges that we should defer to the rule 
that HHS has adopted, which dictates that an administrative 
proceeding is not an adversary adjudication unless a 
representative of the government enters an appearance and 
participates in the proceeding.  We have said that the 
Administrative Conference’s model rules related to the 
EAJA—upon which HHS’s rule is modeled—are entitled to 
“some deference.”  Scafar, 325 F.3d at 428 n.4.  However, we 
have never said that we give the model rules the kind of 
strong deference described in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
Instead, we have only stated that the Administrative 
Conference’s model rules are entitled to some deference 
under the principles of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., pursuant to 
which an agency’s regulations are “not controlling upon the 
courts . . . [but] do constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance.”  323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).  Exercising 
Skidmore deference, a court gives the agency action weight 
according to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”  Id.   
The Administrative Conference gave no explanation 
whatsoever as to why it interpreted the statutory language 
“represented by counsel or otherwise” to mean that an 
individual must enter an appearance and participate in the 
proceeding.  46 Fed. Reg. 32,900, 32,912; see Handron, 669 
F. Supp. 2d at 499 (recognizing that the Administrative 
Conference gave scant attention to the meaning of “or 
otherwise”).  To the extent that the Administrative 
Conference’s model rule can be interpreted to require a 
representative of the government to physically appear at the 
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hearing, the reason for that interpretation was not explained, it 
has no inherent persuasive power, and it thus is entitled to no 
deference under Skidmore.
5
  Therefore, we find the 
government’s argument unavailing. 
  In sum, we disagree with the District Court’s 
conclusion that a human presence at the agency hearing is 
necessary for the government’s position to be represented 
therein.  We believe that a writing can represent the 
government’s position and therefore bring a proceeding under 
the ambit of the EAJA.   
b. 
 Having concluded that a writing can, in certain 
instances, render an administrative hearing an adversary 
adjudication under the EAJA, we now ask whether the written 
materials to which Dr. Handron points—the demand letter, 
the Fair Hearing Officer’s decision, the boxes of medical 
records, and Nurse Clark’s spreadsheet and legend—rendered 
his ALJ hearing an adversary adjudication under 5 U.S.C. § 
504.  We find that they do not. 
                                              
5
 HHS’s rule does not, on its face, require that an individual 
physically appear at the proceeding for it to be considered an 
adversary adjudication.  It only requires that the agency’s 
position be represented by an attorney or other representative 
who enters an appearance and participates in the proceeding.  
45 C.F.R. § 13.3(a).  We pause to note the inconsistency 
between a requirement that the government have a physical 
presence at the hearing in order for its position to be 
represented and the agency’s own regulations, which define 
“participation” in a proceeding to include the filing of written 
position papers.  42 C.F.R. § 405.1010(c). 
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Congress defined an “adversary adjudication” as 
requiring that “the position of the United States [be] 
represented by counsel or otherwise.”  5 U.S.C. § 
504(b)(1)(C).  In determining the meaning of the words “or 
otherwise,” we are aided by principles of statutory 
interpretation.  The interpretive canon of ejusdem generis 
“limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters 
similar to those specified.”  Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 
124, 128 (1936); see also United States v. Winebarger, 664 
F.3d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying canon of ejusdem 
generis).   Similarly, under the maxim noscitur a socciis, the 
meaning of a word is informed by the words that accompany 
it in the statute.  Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 164 & n.14 
(3d Cir. 2004).  Following these principles, we must read 
“otherwise” to mean that the government’s position is 
represented in a manner akin to the representation counsel 
would provide.  See Pollgreen v. Morris, 911 F.2d 527, 533 
(11th Cir. 1990) (reading “otherwise” in the context of § 
504(b)(1)(C) to require representation akin to that provided 
by counsel).
6
  This involves a minimum level of purposeful 
                                              
6
 The Pollgreen court stated that “[t]he word ‘otherwise’ is 
more appropriately read in the context of the entire clause to 
refer to an individual who represents the position of the 
United States in a manner similar to that of counsel.”  911 
F.2d at 533.  That court confronted an argument that a 
government investigator who initiated an administrative 
process had represented the government’s position.  Id.  It did 
not deal with the question we face here, whether a writing can 
represent the government’s position at a hearing and thereby 
make the proceeding adversarial.  We therefore believe that 
the Pollgreen court’s reference to an “individual” was not a 
statement that such individual must personally appear at a 
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advocacy of a legal position directed at the decision-maker.  
Like the writings in Willis and Rowell, the writings to which 
Dr. Handron points do not reflect that kind of purposeful 
advocacy and therefore do not implicate the EAJA.  Willis, 
931 F.2d at 400 (holding that the government’s written 
response to Willis “[did] not amount to the Secretary taking a 
position represented by counsel during the administrative 
phase of Willis’ disability claim”); Rowell, 813 F. Supp. at 81 
(holding that government writing did not represent the 
government’s position).  Here, the government did not take 
any action to advocate for, or urge, its position before the 
ALJ.  It filed no brief, gave no statement, and expressed no 
position, in writing or in person. 
  Of course, the government’s position—that Dr. 
Handron had been overpaid hundreds of thousands of 
dollars—was put before the ALJ in this case, but that does not 
mean that it was “represented” at the hearing in a manner akin 
to the representation counsel would provide.  Whenever there 
is an administrative proceeding of this sort, it will be because 
the government took some kind of position, like denying 
disability benefits to an individual or determining that excess 
benefits have been paid to a beneficiary.  The fact that the 
government previously took a position (and committed it to 
writing) cannot mean that any time such position is appealed, 
the subsequent proceeding implicates the EAJA merely 
because the writing is presented to the ALJ.  Surely, the 
“adjudication” in connection with which the position must be 
represented is the actual § 554 proceeding.     
                                                                                                     
hearing for it to be an adversary adjudication or that the 
government’s position cannot be represented by a writing. 
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While it may seem strange to make eligibility for fee 
reimbursement contingent on whether or not the government 
decides to urge its position, this was clearly the result 
Congress intended in order to give the government some 
control over its costs.  The EAJA’s legislative history 
indicates that, though Congress was concerned with evening 
the playing field for those who might not otherwise be able to 
fight unjustified government action, it was also concerned 
about the public fisc.  It limited the EAJA’s applicability in 
the administrative context to “adversary adjudication[s]” and 
excluded Social Security proceedings in an effort to reduce 
the statute’s costs.  See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 14, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4993 (noting that part 
of the reason the Act “covers only adversary adjudications 
under 554 of title 5” is a “desire to narrow the scope of the 
bill in order to make its costs acceptable”); id. at 20, reprinted 
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4999 (“[T]he Committee has 
eliminated non-adversary adjudications (including 
administrative proceedings under the Social Security Act) 
from the coverage of the principal part of this bill, and 
believes that is a significant factor in reducing the cost.”); 
H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
132, 138-39 (“While, generally, Social Security 
administrative hearings remain outside the scope of this 
statute, those in which the Secretary is represented are 
covered by the Act.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 96-1418, at 12, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4991 (“It is basic 
fairness that the United States not be liable in an 
administrative proceeding in which its interests are not 
represented.”).  This history makes clear that Congress 
intended to allow the government to avoid taking a position in 
certain administrative proceedings and thereby not subject 
itself to possible liability for attorneys’ fees under the EAJA.  
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That is exactly what happened here.  The government did not 
file a brief with the ALJ, let alone make an appearance to 
urge that its position be adopted.  While the government did 
provide the ALJ with a description of the statistical 
methodology it used to arrive at its figure, this did not rise to 
the level of purposeful advocacy directed at the decision-
maker that would render Dr. Handron’s hearing an adversary 
adjudication under the EAJA.  See Pollgreen, 911 F.2d at 
533.  Therefore, although we disagree with the test the 
District Court applied, we agree with its conclusion that Dr. 
Handron’s ALJ hearing was not an adversary adjudication 
and that he is not entitled to collect his fees under the EAJA. 
III. 
 While we conclude from the statutory language and 
legislative history that Dr. Handron’s ALJ proceeding was not 
an adversary adjudication, we wonder if, given the context in 
which the EAJA was passed, Congress really would intend 
this result in today’s world.  As noted above, Congress 
wanted to make clear that Social Security administrative 
proceedings are not adversary adjudications unless the 
government is represented at the hearings.  H.R. Rep. No. 96-
1418, at 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4999; 
H.R. Conf. Rep. 96-1434, at 23, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5012 (remarking that the definition of 
“adversary adjudication” was intended to “preclude[] an 
award in a situation where an agency, e.g., the Social Security 
Administration, does not take a position in the adjudication”);  
H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
132, 138-39.  Congress has never indicated that overpayment 
hearings are to be treated any differently from hearings 
concerning Social Security eligibility, leading us to the 
conclusion that Dr. Handron’s ALJ hearing—like Social 
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Security hearings in which the government makes no attempt 
to advocate its position directly to the decision-maker—does 
not fit the statutory definition of adversary adjudication.  
However, there are differences between the two types of 
hearings.  While it seems fair that a Social Security claimant 
should have to prove his case, and the government can decide 
not to contest it, we wonder if it is equally fair that someone 
in Dr. Handron’s position has to essentially disprove the 
government’s case, with the government choosing not to put 
forth its position.  Even though the government’s position 
was not “represented” at the hearing, Dr. Handron effectively 
had to rebut that position in order to prevail.  As Dr. Handron 
notes, his case strongly resembles many of the circumstances 
that prompted Congress to pass the EAJA.  See generally 
Award of Attorneys Fees Against the Federal Government:  
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties 
and the Administration of Justice of the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 96th Cong. (1980) 
(Serial No. 62).  He was forced to go to great lengths and 
incur significant expense to combat a government allegation 
that would have been potentially ruinous for him financially.  
The fact that the government did not advocate for its position 
before the ALJ may have made his challenge slightly easier to 
win, but merely by taking the position initially, the 
government all but ensured that Dr. Handron would have to 
fight tooth and nail—at substantial financial cost—to be 
vindicated.  To the extent that one of the objectives of the 
EAJA was to ensure that private parties are able to fight 
unjustified government actions, that objective was implicated 
in Dr. Handron’s case.  
Although we understand Congress’s desire to control 
costs, we do not believe that allowing an individual like Dr. 
Handron to satisfy the “adversary adjudication” prong of the 
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EAJA test would open the floodgates to fee awards.  The 
government’s financial interests are additionally protected by 
the statutory scheme that provides that, even if the 
government loses in an “adversary adjudication,” it will not 
have to pay EAJA fees if it can show that its position was 
“substantially justified” or if “special circumstances make an 
award unjust.”  5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1).  These statutory 
provisions provide additional protection for the government 
based on the unique circumstances of the case. 
 Congress has previously amended the EAJA to 
broaden the scope of the EAJA’s application in response to 
judicial interpretation of the statute.  For instance, after courts 
interpreted the “position of the United States” narrowly to 
include only the position taken by the government in 
litigation, Congress responded by amending the statute to 
define that statutory language more broadly.  See Act of Aug. 
5, 1985, Pub. L. 99-80, § 2(c)(2)(B), 99 Stat. 183 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D)); H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 11-12, 
reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 139-40 (explicitly 
repudiating the holdings in Spencer v. N.L.R.B., 712 F.2d 539 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) and Del Mfg’r Co. v. United States, 723 F.2d 
980 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
7
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 A parallel provision, enacted in the same bill, broadly 
defined the statutory language “position of the agency.”  See 
Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. 99-80, § 1(c)(3), 99 Stat. 183 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)(E)).  This amendment, 
however, offers no comfort to those who are forced to fight 
the government in an agency proceeding at which the 
government makes no effort to advocate to the decision-
maker in support of its position.  Such a circumstance would 
still not be considered an adversary adjudication, a 
24 
 
Given Congress’s rationale in passing the EAJA, we 
wonder whether, with the complex and burdensome battle 
that doctors may have to wage in order to vindicate their 
rights when accused of overbilling the government, Congress 
might consider amending the EAJA so that persons in Dr. 
Handron’s position are not disadvantaged by the 
government’s decision not to represent its position in 
proceedings before ALJs.  We leave this policy consideration 
to the lawmakers in Washington, should they wish to 
entertain it. 
IV. 
 In conclusion, unlike the District Court, we do not 
believe that an adversary adjudication under 5 U.S.C. § 
504(a)(1) requires the government to send a human being to 
the relevant agency proceeding.  Rather, we hold that an 
adversary adjudication under 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) requires 
that the government direct some purposeful advocacy at the 
decision-maker, whether written or in person.  That 
requirement was not met in this case.  We will therefore 
affirm. 
                                                                                                     
prerequisite to recovery under § 504 that Congress expressly 
reaffirmed in 1985.  H.R. Rep. No. 99-120, at 10, reprinted in 
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 138-39. 
